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1 Introduction
For more than 50 years, we have observed a worldwide wave of the privatization of state-owned public
enterprises. Nevertheless, many public and semi-public enterprises (i.e., firms owned by both public
and private sectors) are still active in planned and market economies in developed, developing, and
transitional countries. While some public enterprises are traditional monopolists in natural monopoly
markets, a considerable number of public (including semi-public) enterprises compete with private
enterprises in a wide range of industries.1 Optimal privatization policies in such mixed oligopolies
have attracted extensive attention from economics researchers in such fields as industrial organization,
public economics, financial economics, international economics, development economics, and political
economy.2
Specifically, the literature on mixed oligopolies has investigated optimal privatization policy in
different situations. Matsumura (1998) showed that the optimal degree of privatization is never zero
unless full nationalization yields a public monopoly. Lin and Matsumura (2012) found that the op-
timal degree of privatization increases with the number of private firms and decreases with the for-
eign ownership share in private firms. Matsumura and Okamura (2015) showed that more intensive
competition might reduce the optimal degree of privatization, using the relative profit maximization
approach of Matsumura et al. (2013). In free-entry markets, Matsumura and Kanda (2005) showed
that the optimal degree of privatization is zero when private competitors are domestic, while Cato
and Matsumura (2012) found that the optimal degree is strictly positive when private competitors
are foreign and increases with the foreign ownership share in private firms. In addition, Chen (2017)
showed that the optimal degree of privatization is positive even in free-entry markets if privatization
improves production efficiency. Fujiwara (2007) showed a monotonic (non-monotonic) relationship
1Examples include United States Postal Service, Deutsche Post AG, Areva, Nippon Telecom and Telecommunication,
Japan Tobacco, Volkswagen, Renault, E´lectricite´ de France, Japan Postal Bank, Kampo, Korea Development Bank, and
Korea Investment Corporation.
2The idea of mixed oligopoly dates at least to Merrill and Schneider (1966). Recently, the literature on mixed oligopoly
has become richer and more diverse. For examples of mixed oligopolies and recent developments in this field, see Ishibashi
and Matsumura (2006), Ishida and Matsushima (2009), Colombo (2016), Chen (2017), and the papers cited therein.
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between the degree of product differentiation and the optimal degree of privatization in a free-entry
(non-free-entry) market. Cato and Matsumura (2015) discussed the relationship between the optimal
trade and privatization policies in free-entry markets, showing that a higher tariff rate reduces the
optimal degree of privatization. Wu et al. (2016) investigated a vertically related market in which an
upstream foreign monopolist sells an essential input to public and private firms. The authors showed
that full privatization can (cannot) be optimal with the domestic (foreign) ownership in private firms.
One common assumption in these studies is the equal weight of the profit of public firms and the
consumer surplus in welfare. If there is excess burden of taxation (or shadow cost of public funds),
the profit of the public firms might be more valuable for welfare than the consumer surplus is, because
the government can use the profits of the public firms or the revenue from selling the stocks of the
public firms for tax reduction in other markets and thereby reduce the dead weight loss in the markets.
Compensation of government deficit is an important motive for privatization (Vickers and Yarrow,
1988), and it is argued that putting appropriate welfare weights on consumer surplus, firms’ profits,
and government revenues is important in cost–benefit analysis of privatization (Jones et al., 1990).
Thus, models that neglect the shadow cost of public funding fail to incorporate this important factor.
Recently, some studies have incorporated the shadow cost of public funds into mixed oligopolies.
Capuano and De Feo (2010) showed that simultaneous-move outcome appears in the observable delay
game formulated by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) when the shadow cost is high. Matsumura and
Tomaru (2013) showed that the privatization neutrality theorem shown by White (1996) does not
hold unless the shadow cost is zero. Matsumura and Tomaru (2015) showed that locations of both
public and private firms are distorted unless the shadow cost is zero. Xu et al. (2016) showed that
privatization might play the role of a commitment device to agree to FTA and improve both domestic
and global welfare. However, none of these studies has investigated the relationship between the
optimal privatization policy (the optimal degree of privatization) and the shadow cost.
In this study, we investigate the relationship between the optimal degree of privatization and the
shadow cost of public funds. We show that the relationship is non-monotone, and the results crucially
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depend on whether the shadow cost of public funds is larger than one.3
First, we investigate a free-entry market. Owing to recent deregulation and liberalization, entry
restrictions in mixed oligopolies have significantly weakened (Lee et al. 2017). As a result, private
enterprises have newly entered many mixed oligopolies, such as the banking, insurance, telecommuni-
cations, and transportation industries. The literature on mixed oligopolies has intensively investigated
the optimal privatization policy in free-entry markets, as mentioned above. We find that as long as the
shadow cost is lower than one, the optimal degree of privatization can be zero (i.e., full nationalization
can be optimal) and it is more likely when the shadow cost is higher. When the solution is interior
(partial privatization is optimal), the optimal degree of privatization decreases with the shadow cost.
An increase in the shadow cost makes the public firm less aggressive, because the weight of its own
profit becomes larger. This less aggressive behavior makes the private firms more aggressive through
the strategic interaction between public and private firms, which results in a lower profit of the public
firm. In order to keep the public firm aggressive, the government decreases the degree of privatization.
However, when the shadow cost is higher than one, the results change drastically. Full nationaliza-
tion is never a unique optimal solution, and the optimal degree of privatization can be discontinuously
increasing with the shadow cost. As explained above, an increase in the shadow cost makes the public
firm less aggressive and the government should keep the public firm aggressive by adjusting the priva-
tization policy. When the shadow cost is larger than one and the degree of privatization is small, an
increase in the degree of privatization makes the public firm more aggressive, in contrast to the case
in which the shadow cost is lower than one. Therefore, the government should increase the degree
of privatization to keep the public firm aggressive. This is why the results depend on whether the
shadow cost is larger than one.
Our results have important policy implications. The shadow cost of public funds is usually higher
3The shadow cost of public funds is quite popular in many fields of economics. Meade (1944) undertook a pioneering
work, which was developed in Laffont and Tirole (1986). According to Laffont (2005), λ is estimated to be around 0.3
in developed countries and more than 1 in developing countries. In addition, recent analysis has suggested that it can
be higher than one even in developed countries. Furthermore, as Kleven and Kreiner (2006) showed, the cost of public
funds would be larger if endogenous labor force participation by workers were considered. This suggests that the shadow
costs of public funds in both developed and developing countries could be larger than the past estimates, which ignore
this effect. Thus, it is important to discuss the cases in which λ is larger and smaller than one.
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when the government deficit is larger, because the deadweight loss of taxation is proportional to the
square of the tax rate whereas tax revenue is less than proportional to the tax rate.4 Therefore,
our results suggest that as long as the government deficit is moderate (and thus, the shadow cost is
smaller than one), the more deficit the government has, and the less the government should privatize
public firms. However, if the government deficit is quite serious (and thus, the shadow cost is larger
than one), this does not hold. When the shadow cost is larger than one, the government should sell
substantial shares in public firms.
Next, we investigate a non-free-entry market. Although the results are less clear than those with
free-entry markets, we find some important results. We find that when the shadow cost is lower than
one, full nationalization can be the unique optimal privatization policy, whereas it is not when the
cost is higher than one. In addition, we find that full nationalization is much less likely to be optimal
when the shadow cost is larger than one.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a model in a free-entry
market. Section 3 presents the equilibrium analysis and main results. Section 4 discusses a non-free-
entry case. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
Consider a market in which one state-owned public firm, firm 0, competes against n private firms.5
Firms produce perfectly substitutable commodities for which the inverse demand function is denoted
by p(Q), where p is the price and Q is the total output. We assume that p is twice continuously
differentiable and p′ < 0 as long as p > 0. Firm 0’s cost function is c0(q0) +K0 where q0 is the output
of firm 0. Each private firm i (= 1, . . . , n) has an identical cost function, c(qi) + K, where qi is the
4See Browning (1976) and papers cited therein.
5Our result holds even when multiple public firms exist. For a discussion on multiple public firms, see Matsumura
and Shimizu (2010), Matsumura and Okumura (2013), and Haraguchi and Matsumura (2016). However, we do not allow
government nationalization of all firms (the whole industry). As pointed out by Merrill and Schneider (1966), the most
efficient outcome is achieved by the nationalization of all firms in the case in which nationalization does not change firms’
costs (i.e., there is no X-inefficiency in the public firm). The need for an analysis of mixed oligopoly lies in the fact that
it is impossible or undesirable, for political or economic reasons, to nationalize an entire sector. For example, without
competitors, public firms might lose the incentive to improve their costs, resulting in a loss of social welfare. Thus, we
neglect the possibility of nationalizing all firms.
5
output of firm i, c(qi) is the production cost, and K is the entry cost.
6 We assume that c0 and c are
twice continuously differentiable. To ensure an interior solution, we further assume that c′0, c′ ≥ 0,
c′′0, c′′ > 0, c′0(0) = c′(0) = 0, and limq→∞ c′0(q), c′(q) =∞.7
The profit of firm 0 is given by pi0 = p(Q)q0 − c0(q0)−K0, and that of firm i (= 1, . . . , n) is given
by pii = p(Q)qi − c(qi)−K. Domestic social welfare is defined as
W =
∫ Q
0
p(q)dq − p(Q)Q+ pi0 + (1− θ)
n∑
i=1
pii + λ(D +R), (1)
where λ > 0 is the shadow cost of public funds, D is the revenue from firm 0’s dividends, R is the
revenue from privatization, and θ is the foreign ownership share in private firms.8 Private firms are
foreign (domestic) when θ = 1 (θ = 0). The shadow cost of public funds is the deadweight loss from
collecting a unit of tax (excess burden of taxation). Thus, a unit of government revenue from firm 0
yields λ welfare gain, because it saves an excess burden of taxation in the other markets.9
We assume that the financial market is perfect. In other words, the government sells its share in
firm 0 at the fundamental value of the firm. The fundamental value of firm 0, V , equals pi0. Therefore,
at the beginning of the game, the government obtains R = αV if it sells α shares of firm 0. In addition,
6In this study, we allow a cost difference between public and private firms, although we do not allow a cost difference
among private firms. While some readers might consider the public firm to be less efficient than the private firm, not
all empirical studies support this view. See Megginson and Netter (2001) and Stiglitz (1988). In addition, Martin and
Parker (1997) suggested that corporate performance can either increase or decrease after privatization, based on their
study in the United Kingdom. See Matsumura and Matsushima (2004) for a theoretical discussion of the endogenous
cost differences between public and private enterprises.
7In the literature on mixed oligopolies, the model with quadratic production costs is popular and satisfies these
assumptions (De Fraja and Delbono, 1989; Matsumura and Shimizu, 2010). However, another popular model in the
literature, the model with constant marginal costs and cost disadvantage of the public firm, does not satisfy these
assumptions (Pal, 1998; Matsumura, 2003a). The model with constant marginal costs yields a problem in free-entry
markets. For example, suppose that θ = 0. As discussed in Matsumura and Kanda (2005), when the marginal cost of
firm 0 is constant, firm 0’s production level is zero if c′0 > p(Q
∗) and the number of entering firms is zero if c′0 < p(Q
∗).
Therefore, mixed oligopolies do not appear (either a public monopoly or a private oligopoly appears). To avoid this
technical problem, most studies on mixed oligopolies analyzing free-entry markets of homogeneous products assume
increasing marginal costs. Therefore, increasing marginal costs are crucial in our analysis of a free-entry market. However,
we can drop the assumption of increasing marginal costs in the analysis of a non-free-entry market discussed in Section
4.
8For discussions on the nationality of private enterprises in mixed oligopolies, see the literature starting with Corneo
and Jeanne (1994) and Fjell and Pal (1996). See also Pal and White (1998) and Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2005a,b), and
Xu et al. (2016). We assume that the public firm, firm 0, is domestic. For the effect of foreign ownership in semi-public
firm on the optimal privatization policy, see Lin and Matsumura (2012).
9See Matsumura and Tomaru (2013). Introducing the shadow cost of public funding is popular in many contexts.
See studies mentioned in footnote 3.
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at the end of the game, the government obtains D = (1− α)pi0.
Let (1−α) denote the government’s ownership share in firm 0. Following the standard formulation
in the literature on mixed oligopolies, we assume that firm 0 maximizes the weighted average of social
welfare and its own profit, whereas private firms maximize their own profits (Matsumura, 1998). Firm
0 maximizes (1−α)W +αpi0 (α ∈ [0, 1]). In the case of full nationalization (α = 0), firm 0 maximizes
social welfare. In the case of full privatization (α = 1), firm 0 maximizes its own profit.
The three-stage game runs as follows. In the first stage, the government chooses the degree of
privatization, α. In the second stage, each private firm chooses whether to enter the market. In
the third stage, firms entering the market compete in quantities. We use the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium as the equilibrium concept. Throughout this study, we restrict our attention to the case
in which K is small such that the number of entering private firms, n, is larger than one.
3 Equilibrium
We solve the game by backward induction. We discuss the competition in the third stage. Note
that the government has already sold firm 0’s share. Therefore, when firm 0 chooses q0, R was given
exogenously. Firm 0 maximizes (1− α)W + αpi0. The first-order condition of firm 0 is
(1 + (1−α)2λ)p+ (1− (1−α)(1− θ) + (1−α)2λ)p′q0− (1 + (1−α)2λ)c′0(q0)− (1−α)θp′Q = 0. (2)
The first-order conditions of the private firms are
p+ p′qi − c′(qi) = 0 for i = 1, . . . , n. (3)
We assume that the second-order conditions,
(1 + (1− α)2λ)(p′′q0 + 2p′ − c′′0) + (1− α)(−p′ − θp′′Q− (1− θ)p′′q0) < 0 (4)
and
2p′ + p′′qi − c′′ < 0, (5)
7
are satisfied. A sufficient but not necessary condition is that c′′0 and c′′ are sufficiently large. We also
assume
p′ + p′′qi < 0. (6)
This implies that the strategies of private firms in the quantity competition stage are strategic sub-
stitutes.10 A sufficient but not necessary condition is p′′ ≤ 0. These are standard assumptions in the
literature.
Henceforth, we focus on the symmetric equilibrium wherein all private firms produce the same
output level q (i.e., qi = qj = q for all i, j = 1, . . . , n). Solving equations (2) and (3) as well as the
following equation (7) leads to the equilibrium outputs in the third stage, given α and n:
Q = q0 + nq. (7)
Let q0(α, n, λ), q(α, n, λ), and Q(α, n, λ) be the equilibrium firm 0’s output, each private firm’s
output, and the total output in the third stage subgame, respectively.
Lemma 1 Suppose that λ ≤ 1. (i) q0(α, n, λ) and Q(α, n, λ) are decreasing in α, (ii) q(α, n, λ) is
increasing in α.
Proof See the Appendix.
Lemma 2 Suppose that α 6= 1. (i) q0(α, n, λ) and Q(α, n, λ) are decreasing in λ, (ii) q(α, n, λ) is
increasing in λ.
Proof See the Appendix.
Lemma 3 Suppose that λ > 1. (i) q0(α, n, λ) and Q(α, n, λ) are increasing in α for α ∈ [0, 1− 1/
√
λ)
and decreasing in α for α ∈ (1− 1/√λ, 1]. (ii) q(α, n, λ) is decreasing in α for α ∈ [0, 1− 1/√λ) and
increasing in α for α ∈ (1− 1/√λ, 1].
Proof See the Appendix
Lemma 1 is known in the literature when λ is zero (Matsumura, 1998). A decrease in α increases
10We do not assume that the strategy of the public firm is a strategic substitute because the public firm can be a
strategic complement under plausible assumptions when private firms are foreign. See Matsumura (2003b).
8
the weights of consumer surplus and of the gain of reducing excess burden of taxation.
When λ is small, the former (consumer surplus) effect dominates the latter (excess burden of
taxation) effect, and a decrease in α makes firm 0 more aggressive. Because the strategies of the
private firms are strategic substitutes, this decreases the output of each private firm through the
strategic interaction. The direct effect (the effect on firm 0’s output) dominates the indirect effect
(the effect thorough strategic interaction), and thus, the total output is decreasing in α (Lemma 2).
We now explain the intuition behind Lemma 3. When λ is larger and α is smaller, firm 0 is more
concerned with the gain of reducing excess burden of taxation. When λ is large and α is small, a
decrease in α makes the public firm more concerned with its own profit to reduce the excess burden
of taxation, and thus, a decrease in α makes the public firm less aggressive. Therefore, the output of
firm 0 can be increasing in α, which is in sharp contrast to the result of Matsumura (1998). Because
of the strategic interaction, this increases the output of each private firm. Again, the direct effect (the
effect on firm 0’s output) dominates the indirect effect (the effect thorough strategic interaction), and
thus, the total output can be increasing in α.
However, when α is large, an increase in firm 0’s profit is less likely to reduce the excess burden of
taxation because R is given exogenously at this stage and the gain is limited to λ(1− α)pi0. Thus, a
marginal decrease in α makes firm 0 more aggressive, and similar results to Lemma 1 are obtained.
In the second stage, private firms enter the market as long as profit is positive, which yields the
free-entry condition
p(Q)q − c(q)−K = 0. (8)
Let the superscript “L” be the equilibrium outcome of the free-entry equilibrium (long-run equilib-
rium), qL(α), qL0 (α), Q
L(α), nL(α) be the output of individual private firms, the output of the public
firm, the total output, and the number of private firms, which satisfy the equations (2), (3), (7), and
(8), respectively.
Lemma 4 (i) qL and QL are independent of α, λ, and θ. (ii) Suppose that λ ≤ 1. qL0 is decreasing
in α. (iii) Suppose that λ > 1. qL0 is increasing in α for α ∈ [0, 1 − 1/
√
λ) and decreasing in α for
9
α ∈ (1− 1/√λ, 1]. (iv) qL0 is increasing in θ and decreasing in λ. (v) If qL0 is increasing (decreasing)
with a parameter, then nL is decreasing (increasing) with this parameter.
Proof See the Appendix.
Lemma 4(i) is a familiar result in free-entry models (Matsumura and Kanda, 2005; Cato and
Matsumura, 2012) . Lemmas 4(ii)–(iv) are similar to Lemmas 1–3.
Using Lemma 4, we analyze the optimal privatization policy for the government. Consider the first
stage. Let WL(α) be domestic welfare. The government maximizes WL(α) with respect to α. From
Lemma 4(i), we find that the price (and thus, the consumer surplus) is independent of α. In a free-
entry market, the private firms’ profits are zero. Therefore, WL is maximized when pi0 is maximized.
Because the price is independent of α, pi0 is maximized when the price is equal to its marginal cost.
This yields the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Domestic welfare is increasing (decreasing) in p− c′0 if p− c′0 < 0 (p− c′0 > 0).
The derivative of W with respect to α is
dW
dα
=
dQL
dα
(−p′(QL)QL + (1 + λ)p′(QL)qL0 + (1− θ)np′(QL)q)+ dqL0dα (1 + λ)(p(QL)− c′0(qL0 )
+
dqL
dα
(1− θ)n(p(QL)− c′(qL)) + dn
L
dα
(1− θ) (p(QL)qL − c(qL)−K) (9)
=
dqL0
dα
(1 + λ)(p(QL)− c′0(qL0 )), (10)
where the first term and the third term in (9) are zero from Lemma 4(i), and the last term in (9) is
zero from the free-entry condition. From this equation, we can observe Proposition 1.
We now present the results on the optimal degree of privatization. We find that the properties of
optimal degree of privatization drastically change depending on whether λ ≤ 1 or λ > 1. First, we
discuss the case in which the shadow cost of public funds is moderate (i.e., λ ≤ 1). Let αL be the
optimal degree of privatization.
Proposition 2 Suppose that λ ≤ 1. (i) αL < 1 for any λ ∈ [0, 1]. (ii) There exists θa(λ) ∈ [0, 1] such
that αL = 0 for θ ≤ θa(λ). (iii) θa(λ) is increasing in λ. (iv) If θ > θa(λ), αL (> 0) is decreasing in
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λ.
Proof See the Appendix.
Proposition 2(i) states that full privatization is not optimal for any λ. Propositions 2(ii)–(iii) state
that full nationalization is more likely optimal when λ is larger. Proposition 2(iv) states that when
the solution is interior, the optimal degree of privatization is decreasing in λ. Overall, Propositions
2(i)–(iv) suggest that the government should choose a lesser degree of privatization when λ is larger
as long as λ ≤ 1.
This result might be counterintuitive. Usually, the larger the government’s deficit is, the higher is
the marginal cost of public funds, because the deadweight loss of taxation might be proportional to
the square of tax rate and a large deficit requires a higher tax rate. Therefore, Proposition 2 suggests
that the greater is the government’s deficit, the more the government should hold a share in the public
firm. An increase in λ makes firm 0 less aggressive, because it increases the weight of its own profit
in the objective of firm 0. However, this less aggressive behavior induces the additional entry of the
private firms and reduces firm 0’s resulting profit. To offset this effect (to keep the public firm choosing
the marginal cost pricing), the government chooses a smaller degree of privatization when λ is larger.
However, this result depends on the property that q0 is decreasing in α. This holds when λ ≤ 1 but
does not always hold when λ > 1. This yields a different result. The following proposition presents a
relationship between αL and λ when λ > 1.
Proposition 3 Suppose that λ > 1. (i) αL < 1 for any λ. (ii) α = 0 and α = 1− 1/λ yields the same
outcomes, q0, q,Q and n. (iii) If α
L = 0 for λ = λ′, then αL > 0 for any λ 6= λ′. (iv) There exists
θb > 0 such that α
L = 1−1/√λ for θ < θb. (v) There exists θc ∈ (θb, 1) such that there are two optimal
degrees of privatization for θ ∈ [θb, θc]. One lies on [0, 1− 1/
√
λ] and the other on [1− 1/√λ, 1− 1/λ].
The former is increasing in λ and the latter is decreasing in λ. (vi) αL > 1− 1/λ if θ > θc.
Proof See the Appendix.
Proposition 3(iii) states that full nationalization is optimal only in the single value of λ. Moreover,
Proposition 3(ii) implies that full nationalization is never the unique solution, and α = 1 − 1/λ is
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another solution if αL = 0 is a solution. These results are in sharp contrast to Propositions 2(ii)–(iii),
which states that full nationalization is optimal for a wide range of parameters, and this range is wider
when λ is larger, as long as λ ≤ 1.
We explain the intuition. When λ ≤ 1, the output of firm 0 is decreasing in α. If q0 is too small
for domestic social welfare when α = 0, an increase in α is harmful for welfare. In such cases, αL = 0.
However, when λ > 1, the output of firm 0 is increasing in α for α ∈ [0, 1− 1/√λ]. Thus, a marginal
increase in α from zero always improves domestic welfare. If q0 is too large for domestic welfare when
α = 0, a marginal increase in α from zero reduces domestic welfare. However, α = 0 and α = 1− 1/λ
yields the same outcomes, and the output of firm 0 is decreasing in α for α ≥ 1−1/λ. Thus, a marginal
increase in α from α = 1−1/λ improves welfare. Therefore, αL 6= 0 even if q0 is too large for domestic
welfare under full nationalization. Under these conditions, αL = 0 only if q0 is neither too large nor
too small for domestic welfare under full nationalization, which holds for measure zero events.
4 Non-Free-Entry Case
In this section, we investigate the model in which the number of firms is given exogenously. For
simplicity, we consider the case with n = 1. We slightly relax the assumption of the cost functions.
We assume that c0 and c are twice continuously differentiable. To ensure an interior solution, we
further assume that c′0, c′ ≥ 0, c′′0, c′′ ≥ 0, c′0(0) ≤ PM , and c′(0) ≤ PM0 where PM (PM0 ) is the
monopoly price of the private firm. The assumptions on the demand function are common with the
free-entry case. We again assume that the solution at the quantity competition stage is interior.
The game runs as follows. In the first stage, the government chooses α. In the second stage, firms
0 and 1 face Cournot competition. The first-order conditions for firms 0 and 1 are common with those
in Section 3.
Let the superscript ‘S’ be the equilibrium outcome of this game (short-run equilibrium). Let
qS(α), qS0 (α), and Q
S(α) be the output of the private firm, the output of the public firm, and the total
output, respectively, given α.
12
Let αS be the equilibrium α in this game. The first-order condition for the short-run optimal
degree of privatization αS is
dWS
dα
=
∂q0
∂α
(−p′Q+ (1 + λ)(p+ p′q0 − c′0) + (1− θ)p′q1)
+
∂q1
∂α
(−p′Q+ (1 + λ)p′q0 + (1− θ)(p+ p′q1 − c′)) = 0 (11)
Let R1(q0) be the reaction function of firm 1. Define
WR(q0) :=
∫ q0+R1(q0)
0
p(Q)dQ− p(q0 +R1(q0))(q0 +R1(q0))
+(1 + λ)(p(q0 +R1(q0))q0c0(q0)) + (1− θ)(p(q0 +R1(q0))q1c(q1)).
We do not discuss the Stackelberg model with public leadership but discuss the Cournot model.
However, this exposition is useful for subsequent analysis because the government can control q0 by
choosing α and can indirectly control q1 through strategic interaction between two firms. We assume
that WR(q0) is concave.
Proposition 4 If λ ∈ (0, 1], αS = 0 if and only if qS1 (0) ≤ λqS0 (0).
Proof See the Appendix.
We now specify the demand and cost functions and present a result suggesting that αS = 0 for a
wide range of parameters.11
Proposition 5 Suppose that p(Q) = a − Q, c0(q0)k0q20/2, and c1(q1) = k1q21/2, where k0 and k1 are
positive constants. (i) αS = 0 if and only if
g(θ, λ, k0, k1) := λ((1 + λ)(1 + k1) + θ)− (1 + λ)(2 + k0)(1 + k1)
2 + k1
≥ 0.
(ii) g(θ, λ, k0, k1) is increasing in θ and decreasing in k0. (iii) g(θ, λ, k0, k1) is increasing in λ if and
only if k0 ≤ k1 + (2 + k1)(2λ+ θ/(1 + k1)).
Proof See the Appendix.
11The linear demand and quadratic cost functions used in Propositions 5 and 7 are popular in the literature on mixed
oligopolies. See De Fraja and Delbono (1989) and Matsumura and Shimizu (2010). The assumption of concavity of
WR(q0) is satisfied under linear demand and quadratic cost functions.
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Proposition 5(ii) states that full nationalization is more likely optimal when the foreign ownership
share in private firms is larger and the public firm’s cost condition is better. Proposition 5(iii) states
that full nationalization is more likely to take place when λ is high unless the public firm is highly less
efficient than the private firm.
Figure 1 describes the region where full nationalization (α = 0) is optimal for λ ≤ 1, with k0 = 2/15
and k1 = 1/15. Figure 1 indicates that full nationalization is optimal for a wide range of parameters.
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We now discuss the case with λ > 1.
Proposition 6 Suppose that λ > 1. (i) α = 0 is an optimal privatization policy, then α = 1 − 1/λ
is another optimal privatization policy. (ii) α = 0 is an optimal privatization policy if and only if
qS1 (0) = λq
S
0 (0). (iii) If c0 = c (i.e., both firms share a common cost function), then α = 0 is not an
optimal privatization policy.
Proof See the Appendix.
If λ exceeds one, full nationalization is never the unique optimal policy (Proposition 6(i)), and
is rarely one of the optimal policies (Proposition 6(ii)). Proposition 6(ii) is in sharp contrast to
Proposition 4. When λ is less than one, αS = 0 if and only if qS1 (0) ≤ λqS0 (0), and it might hold for a
wide range of parameters, as suggested by Proposition 5 and Figure 1. When λ exceeds one, αS = 0
if and only if qS1 (0) = λq
S
0 (0), which is a much stricter condition.
We explain the intuition behind these results. When λ is less than one, the output of firm 0 is
maximized when α = 0. In other words, the government can reduce but cannot increase the output
of firm 0 by increasing α. Thus, the government chooses α = 0 if qS0 (0) is optimal or is too small for
welfare. When λ exceeds one, the output of firm 0 is neither maximized nor minimized when α = 0.
In other words, the government can reduce as well as increase the output of firm 0 by controlling α.
Thus, the government chooses α = 0 only if qS0 (0) happens to be optimal. Therefore, the government
rarely chooses α = 0 when λ exceeds one.
These results suggest that at least partial privatization should be undertaken if the shadow cost
12If we set k0 = k1 = 1/15, the range is further wider.
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Figure 1: The region where full nationalization is optimal for λ ≤ 1.
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of public funding is high, while full nationalization can be a reasonable option when the shadow cost
is moderate.
Finally, we again specify the demand and cost functions and present a result suggesting that full
nationalization is optimal at best for measure zero events when λ exceeds one.
Proposition 7 Suppose that p(Q) = a − Q, c0(q0) = k0q20/2, and c1(q1) = k1q21/2, where k0 and k1
are positive constants. αS = 0 if and only if g(θ, λ, k0, k1) = 0.
Proof See the Appendix.
Figure 2 describes the region where full nationalization (α = 0) is optimal for λ > 1, with k0 = 2/15
and k1 = 1/15. Figure 2 indicates that full nationalization rarely occurs, at best for measure zero
events.13
5 Concluding Remarks
In this study, we investigate the relationship between the optimal degree of privatization and the
shadow cost of public funds. We find that when the shadow cost of public funds is moderate, full
nationalization is optimal for a wide range of parameters, and the range is wider when the cost is higher.
In addition, we find that when partial privatization is optimal, the optimal degree of privatization is
decreasing in the shadow cost of public funds. When the cost is significant, however, these properties
do not hold. Full nationalization is optimal except for measure zero events, and the optimal degree
of privatization can be increasing in the shadow cost of public funds if it exceeds one. These results
suggest that the society with high public fund costs should privatize firms more.
The shadow cost of public funding might affect many choices of public firms, such as R&D, product
positioning, and environmental activities. Incorporating these activities into the discussion with the
shadow cost of public funding and investigating the optimal privatization policy remains for future
research.
13If we set k0 = k1 = 1/15, full nationalization is never optimal.
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Figure 2: The region where full nationalization is optimal for λ > 1.
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Appendix
In the following proofs, we suppress the arguments of the functions.
Proofs of Lemmas 1–3
Let
H :=
 A 0 B0 p′ − c′′ p′ + p′′q
−1 −n 1
 ,
where A := (1− (1−α)(1− θ) + (1−α)2λ)p′− (1 + (1−α)2λ)c′′0 < 0 and B := (1 + (1−α)2λ)(p′′q0 +
p′) + (1− α)(−p′ − θp′′Q− (1− θ)p′′q0). Let
f1 := (1 + (1− α)2λ)p(Q) + (1− (1− α)(1− θ) + (1− α)2λ)p′(Q)q0
−(1 + (1− α)2λ)c′0(q0)− (1− α)θp′(Q)Q
f2 := p(Q) + p
′(Q)q − c′(q)
f3 := Q− nq − q0.
By differentiating (2), (3), and (7) with respect to x ∈ {n, α, λ}, we obtain
H
dq0dq1
dQ
 = −
∂f1/∂x∂f2/∂x
∂f3/∂x
 dx. (12)
We obtain ∂f1/∂α∂f2/∂α
∂f3/∂α
 =
 (1−α)
2λ−1
1+(1−α)2λp
′(−θQ− (1− θ)q0)
0
0
 ,
∂f1/∂λ∂f2/∂λ
∂f3/∂λ
 =
(1− α)2(p+ p′q0 − c′0)0
0
 .
By applying Cramer’s rule to (12), we obtain
dq0
dα
= −
(1−α)2λ−1
1+(1−α)2λp
′(−θQ− (1− θ)q0)(p′ − c′′ + n(p′ + p′′q))
|H| , (13)
dq
dα
=
(1−α)2λ−1
1+(1−α)2λp
′(−θQ− (1− θ)q0)(p′ + p′′q)
|H| , (14)
dQ
dα
= −
(1−α)2λ−1
1+(1−α)2λp
′(−θQ− (1− θ)q0)(p′ − c′′)
|H| , (15)
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dq0
dλ
= −(1− α)
2(p+ p′q0 − c′0)(p′ − c′′ + n(p′ + p′′q))
|H| , (16)
dq
dλ
=
(1− α)2(p+ p′q0 − c′0)(p′ + p′′q)
|H| , (17)
dQ
dλ
= −(1− α)
2(p+ p′q0 − c′0)(p′ − c′′)
|H| , (18)
where |H| = (p′ − c′′)(A+B) + nA(p′ + p′′q).
From the second-order condition of q0, we obtain A+B < 0. From (6), we obtain (p
′ + p′′q) < 0.
Thus, |H| > 0.
Under these conditions, (13) and (15) are negative (positive), and (14) is positive (negative) if
(1−α)2λ− 1 < (>) 0. If λ < 1, (1−α)2λ− 1 < 0. This implies Lemma 1. Suppose that λ > 1. Then
(1− α)2λ− 1 < (>) 0 if α > 1− 1/√λ] (α ∈ [0, 1− 1/√λ]). This implies Lemma 3.
Finally, (16) and (18) are positive and (17) is negative. These imply Lemma 2 Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4
The following two equations determine the values of qL and QL,
p(QL) + p′(QL)qL − c′(qL) = 0,
p(QL)qL − c(qL)−K = 0.
These are independent of α, λ, and θ. This implies Lemma 4(i).
The values qL0 and n
L are determined by the equations
(1+(1−α)2λ)p(QL)+(1−(1−α)(1−θ)+(1−α)2λ)p′(QL)qL0−(1+(1−α)2λ)c′0(qL0 )−(1−α)θp′(QL)QL = 0
and
QL − nqL − q0 = 0.
The comparative statics with respect to α is(
(1− (1− α)(1− θ) + (1− α)2λ)p′(QL)− (1 + (1− α)2λ)c′′0(qL0 ) 0
−1 −qL
)( dqL0
dα
dnL
dα
)
=−
(
(1−α)2λ−1
1+(1−α)2λp
′(−θQL − (1− θ)qL0 )
0
)
.
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Then, we obtain
dqL0
dα
=
−
(
(1−α)2λ−1
1+(1−α)2λp
′(−θQL − (1− θ)qL0 )
)
(1− (1− α)(1− θ) + (1− α)2λ)p′(QL)− (1 + (1− α)2λ)c′′0(qL0 )
,
which is negative (non-negative) if (1 − α)2λ − 1 < 0 ((1 − α)2λ − 1 ≥ 0). This implies Lemma 4(ii)
and Lemma 4(iii).
Similarly, the comparative statics with respect to λ and θ is
dqL0
dλ
=
−(1− α)2(p(QL)− p′(QL)qL0 − c′0(qL0 )))
(1− (1− α)(1− θ) + (1− α)2λ)p′(QL)− (1 + (1− α)2λ)c′′0(qL0 )
< 0,
dqL0
dθ
=
−p′(QL)(1− α)(q0 +Q))
(1− (1− α)(1− θ) + (1− α)2λ)p′(QL)− (1 + (1− α)2λ)c′′0(qL0 )
> 0,
which implies Lemma 4(iv).
Finally, differentiating QL−nLqL− qL0 = 0 with respect to any parameter x ∈ {α, θ, λ}, we obtain
dnL
dx
qL = −dq
L
0
dx
,
which implies Lemma 4(v). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
By substituting α = 1 into (2), we obtain
p− c = −p′q0 > 0.
In addition, ∂qL0 /∂α < 0 at α = 1 by Lemma 3(i). Thus, we obtain
dW
dα
∣∣∣∣
α=1
< 0.
which implies Proposition 2(i).
From Proposition 1, we obtain that αL is determined by
(∂qL/∂α)(p(QL)− c′0(qL)) = 0
for the interior solution. We define θa(λ) as the value of θ, which satisfies the following equation:[
p(QL)− c′0
]
α=0
= 0.
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Then, for θ ≤ θa(λ), we obtain [
p(QL)− c′0
]
α=0
≥ 0
since qL0 is increasing in θ and c0 is convex. Thus, α = 0 is optimal for θ ∈ [0, θa(λ)], which implies
Proposition 2(ii).
Moreover, we obtain
dθa
dλ
= −c′′0
∂qL0
∂λ
/
c′′0
∂qL0
∂θ
= −∂q
L
0
∂λ
/∂qL0
∂θ
> 0,
which implies Proposition 2(iii).
Next, consider the case of the interior solution, that is, θ > θa. In this case, the optimal degree of
privatization αL is determined by the equation[
p(QL)− c′0
]
α=αL
= 0.
By differentiating this equation with respect to λ, we obtain
dαL
dλ
= −c′′0
∂qL0
∂λ
/
c′′0
∂qL0
∂α
= −∂q
L
0
∂λ
/∂qL0
∂α
< 0,
which implies Proposition 2(iv).
Proof of Proposition 3
The proof of Proposition 2(i) can be applied to Proposition 3(i).
Next, we show that α = 0 and α = 1− 1/λ yields the same outcomes. At α = 0, (2) becomes
(1 + λ)(p+ p′q0 − c′0)− p′(θQ+ (1− θ)q0).
At α = 1− 1/λ, (2) becomes
(1 + 1/λ)(p+ p′q0 − c′0)−
1
λ
p′(θQ+ (1− θ)q0) = 1
λ
(
(1 + λ)(p+ p′q0 − c′0)− p′(θQ+ (1− θ)q0)
)
= 0.
Thus, α = 0 and α = 1− 1/λ give the same first-order condition to firm 0. Since the other equations
are independent of α, α = 0 and α = 1− 1/λ yield the same outcomes.
We now consider λ such that αL = 0. Then, we must have
dW
dα
∣∣∣∣
α=0
=
[
dqL0
dα
(p− c′0)
]
α=0
= 0.
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Since dqL0 /dα > 0 at α = 0, we must have p− c′0 = 0 at α = 0. From (2), this requires
(1 + λ)qL0 − (θQL + (1− θ)qL0 ) = 0
and qL0 = c
′−1
0 (p(Q
L)). Putting these together must yield
(λ+ θ)c
′−1(p(QL))− θQL = 0.
Since the left-hand side of the above equation is monotone in λ, there is only one λ that satisfies the
equation. Under these conditions, we obtain Proposition 3(iii).
We now show Proposition 3(iv). Consider θb such that[
p(QL)− c′0(qL0 )
]
α=1−1/√λ
= 0.
For θ < θb, we obtain [
p(QL)− c′0(qL0 )
]
α=1−1/√λ
> 0.
because qL0 is decreasing in θ, which increases p− c′0. This implies Proposition 3(iv).
We then show Proposition 3(v). Consider θc such that[
p(QL)− c′0(qL0 )
]
α=0
= 0.
For θ ∈ (θb, θc), we obtain[
p(QL)− c′0(qL0 )
]
α=0
> 0 and
[
p(QL)− c′0(qL0 )
]
α=1−1/√λ
< 0.
Thus, αL lies on [0, 1 − 1/√λ]. In conjunction with (ii), we observe that there is another α ∈
[1 − 1/√λ, 1 − 1/λ] that achieves the same outcome with α ∈ [1 − 1/√λ]. Thus, this is also an
optimal degree of privatization. dαL/dλ is given by
dαL
dλ
= −c′′0
∂qL0
∂λ
/
c′′0
∂qL0
∂α
= −∂q
L
0
∂λ
/∂qL0
∂α
,
which is negative (positive) if ∂qL0 /∂α < 0 (> 0). This implies Proposition 3(v).
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Finally, we show Proposition 3(vi). If θ > θc, we obtain
dW
dα
∣∣∣∣
α=1−1/λ
=
[
dqL0
dα
(p− c′0)
]
α=1−1/λ
> 0,
which implies that αL > 1− 1/λ. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4
We obtain
dWS
dα
∣∣∣∣
α=0
=
∂q0
∂α
(−p′Q+ (1 + λ)(p+ p′q0 − c′0) + (1− θ)p′q1) +
∂q1
∂α
(−p′Q+ (1 + λ)p′q0 + p+ p′q1 − c′)
=
∂q1
∂α
(−p′Q+ (1 + λ)p′q0 + (1− θ)(p+ p′q1 − c′))
=
∂q1
∂α
p′(−Q+ (1 + λ)q0)
=
∂q1
∂α
p′(λq0 − q1), (19)
which is non-positive if λq0(0) ≥ q1(0). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5
By Proposition 4, we examine the condition under which λq0(0) ≥ q1(0) holds. q0(0) and q1(0) are
q0(0) =
(1 + λ)(1 + k1) + θ
(1 + λ)((2 + k0)(2 + k1)− 1) + θa
q1(0) =
(1 + λ)(2 + k0)(1 + k1)
(1 + λ)((2 + k0)(2 + k1)− 1) + θ
a
2 + k1
.
αS = 0 if and only if
g(θ, λ, k0, k1) := λ((1 + λ)(1 + k1) + θ)− (1 + λ)(2 + k0)(1 + k1)
2 + k1
≥ 0.
This implies Proposition 5(i).
g(θ, λ, k0, k1) is obviously increasing in θ and decreasing in k0 (Proposition 5(ii)).
We obtain
∂g
∂λ
= (1 + k1)
(k1 − k0 + 2λ(2 + k1))
2 + k1
+ θ,
which is positive if and only if
k0 ≤ k1 + (2 + k1)
(
2λ+
θ
1 + k1
)
.
23
This implies Proposition 5(iii). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6
The proof of Proposition 3(ii) can be applied to the proof of Proposition 6(i).
We then show Proposition 6(ii). Suppose that dWR(q0)/dq0 > 0 at α = 0. Then a marginal
increase in α from α = 0 increases q0 and improves welfare. Thus, α = 0 is not optimal. Suppose
that dWR(q0)/dq0 < 0 at α = 0. Proposition 6(i) states that α = 0 and α = 1− 1/
√
λ yield the same
outcome. Then a marginal increase in α from α = 1 − 1/√λ decreases q0 from qS0 (0) and improves
welfare. Thus, α = 0 is not optimal. Therefore, α = 0 is optimal if and only if dWR(q0)/dq0 = 0 at
α = 0, and holds if and only if (19) is zero. (19) is zero if and only if λqS0 (0) = q
S
1 (0). These imply
Proposition 6(ii).
Finally, we show Proposition 6(iii). If c0 = c1, q
S
0 (1) = q
S
1 (1). Because q
S
0 (α) is decreasing in
α for α ∈ [1 − 1/√λ, 1], is increasing in α ∈ [0, 1 − 1/√λ], and qS0 (0) = qS0 (1 − 1/λ), we obtain
qS0 (α) > q
S
0 (1) for all α ∈ [0, 1]. Because qS1 (α) is increasing in α for α ∈ [1 − 1/
√
λ, 1], is decreasing
in α ∈ [0, 1 − 1/√λ], and qS1 (0) = qS1 (1 − 1/λ), we obtain qS1 (α) < qS0 (1) for all α ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore,
qS0 (0) > q
S
1 (0). Because λ > 1, we obtain λq0 > q1. From Proposition 6(ii), we obtain Proposition
6(iii). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7
In the same way as the proof of Proposition 5, q0(0) and q1(0) are
q0(0) =
(1 + λ)(1 + k1) + θ
(1 + λ)((2 + k0)(2 + k1)− 1) + θa
q1(0) =
(1 + λ)(2 + k0)(1 + k1)
(1 + λ)((2 + k0)(2 + k1)− 1) + θ
a
2 + k1
.
By Proposition 6 (ii), α = 0 is optimal if and only if λq0(0) = q1(0), and holds if and only if
g(θ, λ, k0, k1) = 0. Q.E.D.
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